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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH BLACKE'T'T, dba
J()E'S MOTOR AND
TRAILER SALES,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
FINANCIAL INDEMNITY
COMPANY and S. D. LODER,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 9'940

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiff brought this action in the District
Court against Defendant insurer to recover under a
Dealers' Mobile Home Policy for loss to a mobile
home resulting from collision or upset.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
. :\t the pre-trial hearing, the Court, upon review of the pleadings, examination of the provisions
of the plaintiff's Policy (Exhibit P-1), the purchaser's policy (Exhibit D-2), and a review of the
testin1ony given by plaintiff in his deposition, ruled
as a matter of law that defendant's policy did not
cover the loss claimed by the plaintiff and accord1
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ingly entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and a Judgment of Dismissal from which plaintiff
appeals.
S'TATEMENT OF FAC:TS
The plaintiff and his wife, Erm:a Blackett, are
partners in a business dealing in mobile homes
(trailer homes), ( Depo. P. 4). Erma Blackett is
also a licensed insurance agent to write policies of
insurance on mobile homes ( Depo. P. 5-6) . She
countersigned as agent the policy on which pl'aintiff seeks recovery. (Exhibit P-1). On June 20, 19'61,
Burt Nelson, a salesman working for plaintiff,
agreed to sell S. D. Loder a used 40-foot Nashua
Trailer (Depo. P. 11). Plaintiff, upon learning that
the trailer was to be deliverd to Holbrook, Arizona,
refu-sed to confirm the sale. S. D. Loder then agreed
to pay :an additional $100.00 for the trai'ler to cover
permits, drivers wages and other costs of delivery,
whereupon plaintiff closed the deal and sold Loder
the trailer (Depo. P. 14-15). S.D. Loder paid cash
for the trailer at that time (Depo. P. 13 L. 16),
and effective June 21, 1961, he insured the t~ailer
in 'his name against loss from fire, theft or collision with Farmers Insurance Ex~hange (Exhibit
D-2).
On June 2'2, 1961, the trailer was tipped over
and destroyed near Flagstaff, Arizon:a, while the
plaintiff's employee, Joe Perez, was in the process
of delivering the trailer to Loder at Holbrook, Arizona.
2
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The defendant's policy, among other things, insures 1nobile homes held by the insured (plaintiff)
pending delivery after sale, except as to loss for
lchich the interest of the purchaser is covered by
in.~nrancc. (Exhibit P-1. Auto Dealers' End Monthly
Reporting Form "A", para. 1).
ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT C·ORRECTLY HELD THA·T
THERE WAS NO COVERAGE UNDER THE DEFENDANT'S POLICY.

It is clear under the terms of the ·defendant's
policy that plaintiff has no coverage after the sale
of a trailer and pending delivery, if the purchaser
has obtained insurance. It is not disputed that !a;t the
time of the loss the purchaser, S. D. Loder, had obtained insurance covering the type of loss that occurred. Plaintiff in 'his Brief contends, 'however,
that at the time of the loss ~here had not been a
completed sale and that the policy provision, therefore, does not apply.
The rules governing when property passes from
seller to 'buyer are set forth in Title 60, Ch·apter 2,
Uta:h Code Annotated, 1953. Section 60-2-2 provides:
"Property in specific goods passes when parties so intend. (1) Where there is a contract
to sell specific or ascertained goods, the property in them is transferred to the buyer at
such time as 'the parties to the contract intend
it to be transferred. (2) For the purpose of
ascertaining the intention of the parties, regard shall be had to the terms of the contract,
3
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the conduct of the parties, usages of trade
:and the circumstances of the case."
Under the facts in this case, what were the
terms of the contract? What was the conduct of the
parties and the circumstances of the case which indicates the intent of the parties as to when the
property should plass? S. D. Loder paid cash for the
trailer on June 20, 1961, at 'the time the price was
agreed upon. (Findings of Fact Para. 5, Depo. P.
13, L. 16). He insured the trailer in his name effective the following day and before delivery was made
or even started (Exhibit D-·2) . With regard to the
sale, plain tiff testified in his deposition as follows:
Commencing on Page 12, Line 22:
"Q. Was there a completed sale of this
t~ailer to Mr. Loder?
"A. "Yes."
'Commencing again on Page 14, Line 14:
"A. When I came back from Wisconsin,
Burt Nelson had sold the trailer. I told Burt
right off the bat an·d I told Loder, 'I will not
sell you this trailer under these conditions.'
"Q. You mean for this amount of
money?
"A. This amount of money. I says, 'in
the first place, you sold it too damn cheap.'
I says.. 'T'he next pl~ace is, we have got to
deliver it six or seven hundred miles.' I don't
know how many miles it was, but I don't think
I missed it very far.
4
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"Q.

Go ahead.

"A. I said, 'I can't deliver this trailer
for this kind of money.' (Discussion off record). So Loder agreed to pay one hun·dred
more dollars for the trailer, which would
cover the permits and driver's wages and so
forth, to deliver it.
"Q.

So you closed the deal at that point?

"A.
''Q.

Closed the deal at that point.
And you sold the trailer to him?
Yes.

''A.

"Q. At the time you got back and found
that your salesman had made the sale on the
trailer, did you consider that it was a completed sale?
''A.

No. All deals had to be okayed 'by

me.
"Q. And on his agreement to p·ay an
additional $100.00, you okayed it?
"A. Yes."
Commencing again on Page 15, Line ·2'6:
"Q. So you had a completed sale before
you ever started out?
"A. That is definite on all mobile
homes. We do that."

It is apparent not only from the conduct of the
parties but from the plaintiff's own testimony that
both buyer and seller intended and considered the
sale of the trailer completed. Title 60-2-3 provides:
"R~tles

of ascertaining intention. Unless a dif5
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ferent intention appears, the following are
rules for ascertaining the intention of the
parties as to the time at which the property
in the goods is to pass to the buyer:
Rule ( 1) Where there is an unconditional
contract to sell specific goods in a deliverable state, the property in the goods passes
to the buyer when the contract is m:ade,
and it is immaterial whether the time of
payment, or the time of delivery, or both,
is postponed."
The facts in this case fall well within the provisions of Rule (1) an·d even in the absence of a clear
intent by the parties, the property under this rule
would already have passed to the buyer at the time
the loS's occurred. Such was the ruling of this Court
in Jones vs. Commercial Investment Trust, 64 Utah
151, where the Court in its opinion at pages 163
said:
"The intention must be determined from a conside~ation of the nature and terms of the contract, usages of trade, the conduct of the parties, and the circumstances of the case. If no
contrary intention appears from such a consideration, the l:aw presumes, where the contract pertains to a specific chattel, in a deliverable state, that the parties intend the title
to pass when the contract is m:ade, and this is
true regardless of the fact that payment of
the price or delivery of the goods, or both, be
postponed.''
Plaintiff in his argument relies on the provisions of Rule ( 5) under Section 3, which provides:
6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ulf a contract to sell requires the seller to deliver the goods to the buyer, or at a particular
place, or to pay the freight or cost of transportation to the buyer, or to a particular
place, the property does not pass until the
goods have been delivered to the buyer or have
reached the place agreed upon."
Even assuming 'the absence of a contrary intent, the facts in this case do not fall within the terms
of Rule ( 5). Rule ( 5) contemplates that, under
the :agreement, delivery is to be made by the seller
at his own expense either by delivery himself or by
payment to a carrier of the shipping expenses. In
this case the expense of transporting the trailer
from Salt Lake City to Holbrook, Arizona, was
borne by S.D. Loder by his payment of an :additional
$100.00 on the purchase price to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff in his Brief concludes that the
trial Court n1ust have found that plaintiff had no
insurable interest in the property in order to reach
its conclusions and judgment. Such a finding is not
necessary to the court's ruling. The plaintiff may
well have had an insurable interest as bai'lee but as
stated at the outset, there is no coverage under the
defendant's policy where the property is held by the
ins1tred pending delivery after sale, if the interest
of the p1trchaser is covered by insurance.
7
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CON·CLUSION
It is respectfully submitted th:at the evidence
and the law applicable thereto clearly supports the
findings an·d judgment of the Court below and the
judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully su·bmitted.,
ROBER·T W. B'RANDT, Esq.
Attorney for
DeferuiJant and Respondent
909 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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